Abstract-In this paper we propose a secure anonymous voting scheme (SAnoVS) for re-clustering in the ad-hoc network. SAnoVS extends our previous work of degree-based clustering algorithms by achieving anonymity and confidentiality of the voting procedure applied to select new cluster heads. The security of SAnoVS is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over elliptic curves, the intractability of inverting a one-way hash function and the fact that only neighboring nodes contribute to the generation of a shared secret. Furthermore, we achieve anonymity since our scheme does not require any identification information as we make use of a polynomial equation system combined with pseudo-random coordinates. The security analysis of our scheme is demonstrated with several attacks scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
The self-organization and self-protection of autonomous wireless ad hoc networks remains open field for novel solutions. Self-organization is achieved by grouping the ad hoc nodes in multi-level clusters. In each cluster the cluster head node (CH) is the main node which assumes the burden of numerous tasks, such as message aggregation, message filtering, message forwarding to nodes in other clusters and security tasks, such as message encryption, node authentication and key management.
We address the self-organization of ad hoc networks by allowing the ad hoc nodes to be organized in self-adapted clustered structures (each cluster has a two-hop long diameter) by making autonomous local decisions regarding their cluster head via the use of a voting procedure. We address the protection of such clustered ad hoc networks with the adoption of a conference key distribution system (CKDS) used to establish a shared common symmetric key between the members of the cluster. We note that this common shared key primarily protects the re-clustering procedure (selection of new local cluster heads when the network conditions change) and also can be used to protect the internal ad hoc communications after the formation of the new cluster. The whole scheme is the Secure Anonymous Voting scheme (SAnoVS).
A. Our contributions are:
Autonomous decisions: the ad hoc nodes use a weighted degree-based clustering criterion in order to choose a neighboring candidate to act as cluster head. The nodes vote for that candidate cluster head node.
Secure re-clustering:
In SAnoVS an anonymous secured voting procedure is used to re-cluster the ad hoc network. The maximum number of votes collected is taken into account for the selection of a new local CH. The nodes use SAnoVS to securely communicate their autonomous votes (opinions).
Secure communications:
SAnoVS encapsulates an anonymous CKDS scheme which establishes a common shared secret among the cluster members based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and localization techniques. The exchanged votes and subsequent messages amongst the members can be symmetrically encrypted with this common shared key.
Anonymous communication:
SAnoVS does not require any node identification information as it makes use of a polynomial equation system with Langrage interpolation and pseudorandom node positioning.
Security vulnerabilities: SAnoVS overcomes the identified weaknesses of the previous CKDS as described in section II.
B. Motivation Our motivation was to extend our previous work on ad hoc clustering [8] to include anonymous and secure voting in the new cluster head selection procedure. This paper is organized as follows. In section II we examine the weaknesses of previous works, in section III we present the proposed scheme and in section IV we analyze the security of our scheme by examining certain attack scenarios. Finally, section V concludes with future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we focus our review on previous CKDS. In [1] the CKDS concept was first introduced. In [2] a CKDS with user anonymity based on an algebraic approach was proposed with the use of one-way hash functions to hide the identities of the attendants. In [3] the Tseng-Jan scheme proposed two improvements of [2] . The first proposed CKDS used polynomial interpolation for the computation of the conference key (CK) and the second one did not use a oneway function. In 2003 an ECDLP-based scheme was proposed by Yang et al. [4] . In this scheme the conference key is randomly chosen by the chair person who then broadcasts to the attendants the values y i that belong to a linear curve. In 2004 the authors of [5] ([6] ) assume that the private keys x i are randomly assigned by the system to the nodes and delivered to them through a secure channel, which is unsafe because increases the chances to solve the ECDLP. Private keys generated on demand by an assymetric cryptosystem should be kept inside the nodes. The limitation in this case is the computational cost to generate those keys.
• The Kim et al. scheme uses the polynomial interpolation approach. For n small (i.e., in realistic scenarios five or less attending nodes) then the Lagrange polynomial would have a very small degree n − 1 . In addition with a poorly designed Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) it could be easily solved by an attacker.
• The Kim et al. scheme still depends on the identities of the attendants for the calculation of the hash values h .
• In the Kim et al. scheme if the private key x i is found by solving the ECDLP then an attendant attacker by brute force attack against one-way function could find the corresponding identity and break the anonymity of the system (knowledge of who owns a specific private key and moreover who of the attendants owns a specific session key).
Considering the above weaknesses, it is essential to propose a new secure anonymous scheme for re-clustering in ad hoc networks.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In order to protect the voting scheme described in Part B of this section, where an ad-hoc cluster changes its head upon node decisions, we propose the SAnoVS scheme. Our SAnoVS follows the same principles of a ( , ) -threshold secret-sharing scheme (TSS = (PG, DS, SC)), which consists of three efficient algorithms: the public parameter generation (PG), the dealer setup (DS) and the share combiner (SC) to distribute a shared secret that we refer to as (CK).
The PG algorithm takes as input a security parameter pair ∈ K (here K denotes the secret set {0,1} ) and returns a string ∈ Y of public parameters (here Y denotes the public set {0,1} ). The DS algorithm takes as input a security/public parameter pair ( , ) and a secret from the secret space ( , ) ⊆ {0,1}
! and returns a list of shares = ( ! , … , # ), where is the $ th share space ( , ) for $ = 1, … , .
The SC algorithm takes as input a security/public parameter pair ( , ) and any subset % = { ∶ $ ∈ '} of out of the shares, and returns a recovered secret ∈ ( , ) (here ' denotes a subset of [ ] of size #' = ).
The correctness and security parameters properties of a ( , )-threshold secret-sharing scheme can be quantified by the definitions of those in [9] .
Public Parameter Generation (PG): Initially, each cluster head publicly chooses an elliptic curve E over a finite field GF(q) and a base point G of order p. Then, each node secretly chooses pseudo-random coordinates, x , y ∈ [1, p − 1] that define a point Z , and broadcasts the corresponding public key Q = Z G to each node U ∈ A (let A = {U ! , U 5 , … , U 6 } denote the set of all m nodes in the ad-hoc network).
Dealer Setup (DS): In order the cluster head, U 7 , to distribute the shared secret in cluster members B, it computes the pair-wise keys k 7 = Z 7 Q shared with each U . Then, U 7 computes the hash value h = H(k 7 || Z 7 || Z || T ) || m and constructs a polynomial with degree n − 1 using points (h , H(h )) by applying Langrage polynomial interpolation, similar to [9] . 
Hence, the shared secret is the constant value of (1), CK = c [ . Next, U 7 computes the check value of the shared secret and adds timestamp T, as V = H(CK || Z 7 || T ) before U 7 broadcasts the message:
In order to prevent small degree of polynomial, which translates to small number of neighboring nodes, U 7 generates additional pseudo-random coordinate pairs (h , H(h )) to increase the number of points available, however the number of additional points should be adjustable to the capacity of the ad hoc nodes.
Share Combiner (SC):
In this stage, each U in the cluster receives the message M and performs the share combiner recovery procedure, where only U ∈ B can recover the correct CK after Step1 to Step4.
Step1. First, U verifies the expiration of the received timestamp, T and if it is invalid, U terminates the recovery process.
Step2. Second, U computes the shared pseudo-random coordinates with U 7 , as k 7 = Z Q 7 .
Step3. Third, U computes h = H(k 7 || Z 7 || Z || T ) || m and solves CK from the following equality: 
Step4. Finally, U checks the validity of CK by verifying
Only a valid member of the cluster l ∈ m can recover the valid shared secret, CK, from the above equation with the use of pair-wise session key k n shared with U 7 . In SAnoVS, we construct our polynomial without using identities and we compute the shared secret, CK, by using polynomial equation system in SC stage. Therefore, SAnoVS does not require any user identification information or unecessary computation costs for the attending members of the cluster. During the SAnoVS voting procedure the attending members cannot exchange their encrypted votes with the session key k 7 to choose the next cluster head but only with the CK to avoid chosen plaintext attacks.
A. Local Candidate Selection
The highest degree algorithm [7] is a well-known ad hoc clustering algorithm in which as local CH is selected the node with the maximum connectivity degree, i.e., the node having the maximum number of uncovered in-range neighbors (periodic broadcast hello messages are used by the ad hoc nodes for one-hop neighbor detection). We adopt here for candidate selection a weighted clustering variable V i which is a simplified variation of the clustering criterion defined in [8] . In more detail, we assume that the energy e i along with the connectivity degree d i of each node i are included in the hello broadcasts. Then, each node participating in the re-clustering procedure calculates the value of V i for each neighbor i, including itself, by using the coefficient α (weighs degree and energy):
The neighbor with the maximum V i constitutes the CH candidate node, opinion that the participating node will communicate during the SAnoVS voting procedure.
B. New Cluster Head Selection with Voting
The re-clustering procedure (selection of a new set of cluster heads to maintain a connected structure) is initiated in ad hoc networks given that some criteria are fulfilled. For example, in the LCC algorithm [10] re-clustering is initiated when two cluster heads come in range and in [11] lower overhead than LCC is demonstrated if the cluster head change is deferred for a period of time which depends on the speed of the two moving cluster heads that meet. In [12] re-clustering is initiated by the current local CH when its energy drops below a specific threshold value, a criterion that we also adopt here. We also assume that each node has created a priori its long-term public-private key pair with the use of ECC and that the public key is broadcasted to the ad hoc network. The reclustering procedure includes the following steps:
Step1: CH detects that the energy threshold is reached so that re-clustering must be initiated.
Step2: CH executes the dealer setup algorithm.
Step3: CH starts a Voting_period timer and broadcasts a Voting_initiation message to his (n known) cluster members including the message M with the − 1 Lagrange coefficients, Equation (2).
Step4: On reception of the Voting_initiation message the cluster members: a) Recover the key CK by executing the share combiner algorithm. b) Apply our candidate selection procedure described in A, this section, to identify their vote (the resourceless current CH is excluded from the candidates). c) Unicast to the current CH a Voting_response message including their candidate vote encrypted with the CK.
Step5: On reception of the Voting_response(s) the current CH checks for double votes received from exactly the same pseudo-random coordinates and if no duplicate exists stores the encrypted votes in a Voting _table otherwise drops the duplicate votes.
Step6: When the Voting_period timer expires, the current CH decrypts the secured votes using the CK and stores the collected votes per each candidate in the Voting _table. New CH is the node with the maximum number of collected votes. The scheme adopted in [12] foresees the selection of a vice CH which is the node with the second highest number of votes taking over in the case that the CH disappears before he terminates the election. The new CH broadcasts a CH_Announcement message including his ID.
Step7: The nodes that hear the CH_Announcement message unicast a Registration message including their ID to affiliate with the new CH.
Step8: The new CH collects the memberships and unicasts a Confirmation message to each member (leadership is now ceded).
IV.
SECURITY ANALYSIS Our scheme follows well-defined cryptographic assumptions: the intractability of computing the ECDLP, the hardness of inverting a one-way function and the pseudorandomness of the coordinates. If these assumptions can be solved easily, then SAnoVS cannot provide user anonymity and data privacy. In addition, we assume that the legitimate ad hoc nodes have the necessary capacity to generate a public-private key pair using an ECC. Considering that, each cluster node U ∈ B dynamically generates an elliptic curve key pair, whose secret key Z ∈ [1, p − 1] i.e., x , y ∈ [1, p − 1] is already known to the cluster head, and public key Q is broadcasted to the ad hoc nodes of the network. Therefore, this section presents several basic attack scenarios to demonstrate how the security is enhanced by the proposed CKDS scheme in comparison to the previous schemes.
Attack scenario 1 (conspiracy attack): Assume an attacker j is a cluster node that knows CK and which from Q tries to find the session key of another cluster node i. Knowledge of point Z of the other cluster member i would allow to compute the session key k 7 . However, in order to find the pseudorandom coordinates of point Z , the attacker needs either to solve ECDLP or brute force the [1, p-1] space. In addition, to reveal k 7 attacker j should launch brute force attack to guess k 7 from unknown h that must belong to the polynomial curve.
The same applies when more than one cluster nodes collaborate to reveal the session key of another cluster member. Apparently this is more secure than the Yang et al. scheme in which the participant attackers can obtain h and try launching brute force attack against the one-way function to obtain k 7 and ID , and offers greater anonymity than the Kim et al. scheme. Yang et al. have already shown that the second Tseng-Jan scheme is vulnerable to conspiracy attack.
Attack scenario 2 (recovery of CK from a non cluster node): Assume an attacker j that does not belong to the cluster tries to reveal the common share secret CK from capturing the message M in DS phase. The attacker should first have to compute the hash value h = H(k 7 || Z 7 || Z || T ) || m and then try to recover the CK based on the knowledge of the message M. However, non-cluster node has not the ability to obtain h , because the difficulty involved in generating the coordinates Z is based on the ECDLP.
Attack scenario 3 (breaking anonymity of cluster members): Assume a cluster node U x ∈ B tries to find the identity of another cluster node. The cluster nodes U ∈ B can easily reconstruct the share secret CK. However, it is infeasible to find the identity of another neighboring node since the node identities are not included at any stage of the proposed scheme. In previous CKDS schemes the identity can be revealed with brute force attack in the one-way function A( ). The drawback of keeping total anonymity (attacker can capitalize on a total anonymous scheme) is compensated by the fact that we use the points Z in the computations of the hash values.
Attack scenario 5 (impersonation attack): An attacker tries to replay an intercepted message M = (Z 7 , V, T, c aO! , c aO5 , … , c ! ) to impersonate the cluster head U 7 to hold the voting procedure. The attacker should set a new acceptable timestamp T, so that the cluster nodes can verify the validity of T in DS phase. Then, the cluster nodes compute k 7 and h to solve the CK and ckeck the validity of CK by verifying H(CK || Z 7 || T ) = V. However, the attacker can not forge a valid CK without knowing Z 7 from Q 7 . To obtain Z 7 from Q 7 is equivalent to solving the ECDLP. The cluster nodes can verify the validity of V at SC recovery stage. Therefore, an attacker cannot obtain any secret by replaying an intercepted message of equation (2), i.e., M = (Z 7 , V, T, c aO! , c aO5 , … , c ! ).
V. CONCLUSION
When clusters need to select their head node in ad-hoc networks it is desirable all cluster members to participate in this procedure. The most popular selection procedure is through voting and vote privacy can be achieved through encryption with the use of a shared secret key. Therefore, in the context of secure clustered ad hoc networks we have proposed improvements on calculating and distributing a shared secret key without revealing the identities of the participating nodes. Moreover, linear threshold schemes with elliptic curve cryptographic techniques are applied to distribute such shares. In particular, we have used pseudorandom coordinates of the participating nodes during the public key generation stage; during the set up of the shared secret; and during voting for the new cluster heads. Our scheme has been evaluated with attack scenarios and proved that we overcome the vulnerabilities of the previously proposed schemes.
In the future we are planning to analyze through experiments the efficiency of our CKDS proposal. Furthermore, we will compare the performance of the centralized secure voting scheme described in this paper with a distributed variance of it by allowing the cluster members to broadcast the votes in their neighborhood encrypted with the established CK and by reducing further the cluster head's key control. Hence, each node will count the collected votes of each neighbor and decide upon the new cluster head.
